A fault tree is constructed to represent the major failure mechanismsof a plant for the production of vinyl acetate. Component failure rates from different sources are compared and provide input information for its quantitative evaluation. Results with and without inclusion of humanerror are calculated and proposals for an improvement of the original design are made. The dispersion of failure rate data is described by a log-normal distribution and its effect on the value obtained for system unreliability is assessed.
Introduction
The risk involved in manychemical processes calls for a systematic analysis of their safety. A number of qualitative and quantitative methods are available for this purpose, as discussed in ref.
1. Among them figures fault tree analysis,2'3) a procedure which is widely used in the assessment of the safety of nuclear power stations and has been applied to chemical installations in somecases, e.g. refs 4-6. In the present work, fault trees for a plant for the production of vinyl acetate are constructed and evaluated numerically in order to assess its safety, taking into account the influence of humanerror, whose importance for the validity of the results is underlined e.g. by
Howland,7) and the uncertainty of failure rate data.
1. ThePlant
Process description
The plant, whose flow sheet is given in Fig. 1 , produces vinyl acetate according to the exothermal reaction Ar'Zn HC =CH +CH3-COOH^Ĥ
2C=C-O-C-CH3
(AH= -1 18 kJ/g-mol) H O which takes place between acetylene and acetic acid in gaseous phase at a pressure of 1 bar and a tempera-ture between 170 and 210°C. The reaction heat is removed by a cooling circuit filled with oil at atmospheric pressure.
The acetic acid is supplied from storage to the evaporation installation.
Its temperature is raised to 120°C by heat exchange with process steam in evaporator Ex. After separation of the liquid phase in separator E2 the saturated acetic acid vapor flows to heat exchanger Ht where it receives heat from the oil of the reactor cooling circuit. It then enters the mixer Mi to form a mixture of8 moles of acetylene per mole of acetic acid. Before reaching reactor Rx the mixture exchanges heat with the oil of the reactor cooling circuit and attains a temperature between 160°C and 210°C.
The cooling circuit is basically formed by heat exchangers H2 and H3 and electric circulation pump Px. Heat exchanger H2only works during start-up, when the cooling circuit is used to raise the reactor temperature to reaction conditions with the help of plant process steam. The reaction heat during stationary plant operation is transmitted in heat exchanger H3 to an open cooling water circuit.
Control and safety devices
In order to maintain the reaction temperatures within the prescribed limits the cooling circuit is equipped with a control system composedof temperature indicator and controller TIRC1 and pneumatic valve Q. Q varies the quantity of coolant recirculated via H3 to the suction side of the pump according to the oil outlet temperature of the reactor. The valve has the fail-safe property of opening completely on instrument air failure. It can be manipulated from the control room, where readings from TIRC1 and the oil inlet temperature indicator and recorder TIR 1 are available. Manual control of the cooling circuit is possible on the basis of temperature readings from either of the two instruments if the control system should fail. In this case, manual valve Yx in the bypass of control valve Cl9 which is normally closed, is used. Coolant flow is monitored by flow meter Fl5 which permits detection of pump failure or inadvertent closure of valves V5 or V6. Vent Si allows pressure relief of the cooling circuit in cases of overpressure which might occur, for example, upon contact of its oil with the reactants due to a perforation of a tube of the reactor. In addition, it provides N2 blanketing for the coolant. Vent S2 protects the acetylene supply system, which apart from that is equipped with several other protective devices upstream, from overpressure and furnishes N2 Sx is possible, unless a thermal runaway reaction produces a massive tube rupture; (h) the cooling circuit cannot be heated up erroneously by heat exchanger H2 as process steam is no longer available after start-up and valves Vn and V12 are closed. Except for (e), (f), (g), which are supported by the plant owner's experience, and (h), which refers to a highly improbable event, all hypotheses are conservative. External and secondary effects are included in the tree in a global fashion with an estimated probability because their detailed analysis would be beyond the scope of this paper.
Component Data and Failure Probabilities
The set offailure data used is given in Table 2 along with the basic events of the fault trees for the original and modified designs. Failure probabilities are calculated according to
where kt is the failure rate for basic event z, or constant probabilities, ui9 are used. Failure of temperature measuring instruments TIR 1 and TIRC 1 is supposed to be detected easily because readings from both have to bear a definite relation with one another and with the reaction temperature. Therefore, asymptotic unavailabilities are used to describe their behavior, e.g. ref. 15, supposing that the associated downtime is Tr= 3 h u' = j^fr
Flow meter F} is treated in the same way since a mass flow reading outside the range prescribed during plant operation would call for operator intervention, whose possible error in all aforementioned cases is provided for in the fault tree.
A second set of failure data is obtained taking into account the differences between the values indicated in various sources. Each value is considered as an event belonging to a statistical sample from a population distributed according to a log-normal distribution as outlined in ref. 14 with the probability density function, cf. ref. 16 .
The expression of Eq. (3) 
and the factor of dispersion K=h±=el.645s (5) which is chosen such that the probability for a value of X to be comprised in the interval [A50/K, A50à"K] amounts to 90%, its probability to fall below or above the bounds of the interval being 5% each. The parameters required for the application of Eq. (4) are calculated from the failure rates Xn given in different data collections using the point estimateŝ
where N denotes the total number of values available. The parameters obtained in this way are presented in under the assumption that the probability of such an act is 0.1 after 20 years. In the case of two redundant valves loose coupling is assumed, making use of a relation stated in ref. 18 , which leads to a probability of 0.032 after 20 years. In addition, a lower bound for the unreliability of the plant is calculated supposing that human error does not occur, thus throwing some light on the purely technical aspects of the system. 4. Fault Tree Evaluation The fault tree is decomposed into its minimal cut sets, each of which comprises the minimal number of basic events-represented by the binary variables xtwhich have to occur simultaneously in order to make the system fail. Fromthe minimal cut sets the multilinear form of the structure function of the system is calculated, as indicated in ref. 5. It allows system unreliability to be assessed, replacing the binary variables xt by their corresponding probabilities. The analysis is carried out using the computer code ARBOL,19)which gives an upper bound for system Indicates components to be serviced every 2880 h.
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Searching the two-event cut sets for potential commonmode effects, only a pumpfailure affecting flow meter F1 is discovered. Since the influence would have to be such that correct flow is indicated although there is too little or none, the contribution of this event to plant unreliability is considered negligible.
The results obtained from the evaluation of the fault trees of Fig. 2 for the original and modified designs with the data of Table 2 are represented in which reveals the following important contributions to system unreliability: (a) mechanical failure of valves V4 (x9) and V10 (x29), 29% each; (b) rupture of the bundle of heat exchanger H3 (x31), 3.5%; (c) mechanical failure of drains V7 Oq), V8 (x43), V9 044), 1.2%. The joint contribution of humanerror amounts to 15% and reflects the relatively low degree of automation of the plant. Humanerror alone is capable of bringing about the undesired event if valves V4 or V10 are closed by mistake (x14, x30) or valves V7, V8 or V9
are opened inadvertently (x2, x45, x46). All the other manual valves figure in minimal cut sets which com-prise more than one basic event, hence their failure alone cannot makethe system fail. For this reason the proposed modification consists in installing additional valves in parallel to V4 and V10 and in series with V7, V8 and V9. This measure increases plant reliability by a factor of about 2.7
(based on mean values) and reduces the contribution of humanfailure to about one-half. Since the system is serviced periodically, the unreliability calculated for the time until the first inspection maybe regarded as representative for the entire plant life, although a slight increase is to be expected at later stages due to those components whose possible defects cannot be detected in routine servicing. These components should therefore be subjected to a more profound revision after a certain number of the usual inspection intervals. An additional calculation gives an unreliability of Q (2880h)=1.92x lO"1 for the plant without flow meter F1? which has been installed by the owner after commissioning, thus revealing its importance for the safety of the plant. It protects the installation even more efficiently than placing an additional pumpin parallel to Pu a measure which leads to an unreliability of Q (2880h)=7.85 x 10"2. The effectiveness of flow measurement, however, depends on quick discovery of its possible defects and their immediate repair; the redundant pump, on the other hand, would improve plant availability. As can be read from Table 5 , the unreliabilities obtained when log-normally distributed failure rates are used differ from those which result with mean values for the failure rates. This is due to the fact that mean values of products are formed in evaluating the fault tree in the first case as opposed to products of meanvalues in the second. The two do not normally coincide. The considerable spread of the results reflects data uncertainties, especially for pumps and the failure of manual valves.
Conclusions
Fault tree analysis has proved useful in revealing weaknesses of the original design of the plant, thus allowing its systematic improvement. Attention has been drawnto componentsand procedures which are vital to plant safety. The relatively high spread of the values for unreliability when log-normally distributed input data are used indicates that a firmer basis of failure data is desirable. In addition, a number of pessimistic hypotheses had to be made in the elaboration of the fault tree because the underlying phenomena are not yet completely understood. Therefore, the objective of this type of analysis should, at present, be comparison of alternative designs rather than assessment of plant unreliability in absolute terms.
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Introduction
In industrial gas absorption processes, nonaqueous solutions are sometimespreferred to aqueous ones. However,there have been few studies of the absorption mechanismfor non-aqueous solutions10) in comparison with those for aqueous solutions. It has been known that liquid-phase mass transfer coefficient kh for organic solvents is larger than that for water and that kL is apparently inversely proportional to the surface tension of the solvents.3'4'6) The authors have studied the mechanism of how surface tension affects the mass transfer rate6) and have found that inter facial turbulence occurs and enhances the mass transfer rate whenCO2is absorbed into organic solvents. Received April 25, 1983 . Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to M. Hozawa. N. Komatsu is now with Kobe Steel, Ltd., Kobe 651.
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The aim of this work is to clarify the behaviour of inter facial turbulence experimentally in a wide range of gas-liquid contact time.
1. Experimental 1.1 Experimental apparatus To measure liquid-phase mass transfer coefficient kh in a wide range of contact time, three types of apparatus, a wetted-wall column, a two-dimensional source flow celln) and a quiescent liquid cell, were used. Figures 1 and 2 show the wetted-wall column and the two-dimensional source flow cell. The quiescent liquid cell is made of a cylindrical glass bottle of 5.2cm I.D. and 25 cm height, where the liquid depth is 20cm.
Methanol and toluene were mainly used as the solvents. Water was also used in the source flow cell
